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Abstract—We design a new secure transmission scheme in
the relay wiretap channel where a source communicates with a
destination through a decode-and-forward relay in the presence
of spatially random-distributed eavesdroppers. For the sake of
practicality, we consider a general antenna configuration in which
the source, relay, destination, and eavesdroppers are equipped
with multiple antennas. In order to confuse the eavesdroppers, we
assume that both the source and the relay transmit artificial noise
signals in addition to information signals. We first derive a closed-
form expression for the transmission outage probability and an
easy-to-compute expression for the secrecy outage probability.
Notably, these expressions are valid for an arbitrary number of
antennas at the source, relay, and destination. We then derive
simple yet valuable expressions for the asymptotic transmission
outage probability and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability,
which reveal the secrecy performance when the number of anten-
nas at the source grows sufficiently large. Using our expressions,
we quantify a practical performance metric, namely the secrecy
throughput, under a secrecy outage probability constraint. We
further determine the system and channel parameters that
maximize the secrecy throughput, leading to analytical security
solutions suitable for real-world deployment.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, wiretap channel, relay,
secrecy outage, stochastic geometry, artificial noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY is a vital issue in wireless communicationnetworks since data transmissions over the shared physical
medium are inherently vulnerable to potential eavesdropping.
Traditionally, security in wireless communication networks
is realized by cryptographic techniques applied to the upper
layers utilizing secret keys. The secrecy provided by such
techniques is achieved under the assumption of finite compu-
tational capability at the eavesdroppers. However, this assump-
tion cannot be easily satisfied with the rapid and continuous
growth of the computational capability of modern proces-
sors, which makes the traditional cryptographic techniques
increasingly weak. Moreover, the ever-expanding size of de-
centralized wireless networks introduces significant challenges
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to key distribution and management. Against this backdrop,
physical layer security has been proposed as a complementary
technique to traditional cryptography, due to its benefits in
enhancing the secrecy level of wireless communications by
direct exploiting the randomness offered by wireless channels
[1, 2]. In seminal studies, e.g., [3], it was established in a
single-input single-output wiretap channel that secrecy can
only exist when the wiretap channel between the source and
the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the main channel
between the source and the legitimate receiver. This result was
later generalized to the case where the main channel and the
wiretap channel are independent [4].
Deploying multiple antennas at the source and/or the legiti-
mate receiver has been shown to effectively boost the physical
layer security of wiretap channels [5–17]. The effectiveness of
multiple antennas relies on the use of secure multi-input multi-
output (MIMO) techniques, such as beamforming [5–9], arti-
ficial noise (AN) [10–13], and transmit antenna selection [14–
17]. In the MIMO setting, the presence of randomly distributed
eavesdroppers has been recently investigated [18–22]. In order
to statistically characterize the secrecy performance of such
scenarios, stochastic geometry and random geometric graphs
are often used to model the locations of spatially random-
distributed nodes. With such modeling, [18] investigated the
throughput of large-scale decentralized wireless networks with
physical layer security constraints. Considering the path loss
as the sole factor affecting the received signal-to-noise ra-
tios (SNRs) at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
[19] examined the secrecy rate in cellular networks. In [20]
and [21], the secrecy rate achieved by linear precoding was
analyzed for the broadcast channel and the cellular network,
respectively. In [22], the impact of AN was investigated.
The above works [5–22] examine physical layer security in
point-to-point MIMO systems. Cooperative relaying, on the
other hand, is another promising and widely-adopted tech-
nique that efficiently improves the coverage and reliability of
wireless networks [23, 24]. In order to enhance physical layer
security in relay wiretap channels, a variety of approaches
have been investigated such as cooperative beamforming [25–
28], relay selection [29, 30], and cooperative jamming [31,
32]. However, a common limitation of [25–32] is that they
only considered fixed locations of eavesdroppers. This leaves
open the problem of designing relay-aided secure transmission
schemes for the scenario where the locations of eavesdroppers
are spatially randomly distributed.
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In this work we design a new relay-aided secure trans-
mission for the relay wiretap channel. In such a channel,
the communication between the source and the destination
is aided by a decode-and-forward (DF) relay and overheard
by multiple spatially random-distributed eavesdroppers. We
focus on the general scenario where the source, the relay, the
destination, and the eavesdroppers are equipped with multiple
antennas, which stands as a major advancement over the
previous studies on securing the relay wiretap channel [25–
32]. In order to confuse the eavesdroppers, we assume that in
the secure transmission the source and the relay transmit AN
signals together with information signals in the first hop and
the second hop, respectively1. The contributions made by this
work are summarized as follows:
1) We derive a closed-form expression for the transmission
outage probability and an easy-to-compute expression
for the secrecy outage probability. Notably, both expres-
sions are independent of realizations of channels and
valid for an arbitrary number of antennas at the source,
relay, and destination. Moreover, these expressions serve
as the key results that enable us to explicitly characterize
the secrecy throughput of the considered relay wiretap
channels.
2) We derive simple yet valuable expressions for the
asymptotic transmission outage probability and the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability. These expres-
sions quantify the secrecy performance in the regime
where the number of antennas at the source becomes
sufficiently large. Based on our analysis, we find that
the asymptotic transmission outage probability is de-
termined by the average SNR of the relay-destination
channel only. We also find that the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability approaches a certain value which is
independent of the number of antennas at the source.
3) We determine the transmission parameters, i.e., the
wiretap code rates and the power allocation factors, that
maximize the secrecy throughput of the considered relay
wiretap channels under a secrecy outage probability
constraint. Moreover, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of the determined transmission parameters on maximiz-
ing the secrecy throughput. Furthermore, we evaluate
the impact of the system parameters, e.g., the number
of antennas and the density of eavesdroppers, on the
secrecy throughput.
Beyond the above contributions, we provide some pivotal
insights into the practical design of secure transmission. First,
we show that the AN signals from the source play a more dom-
inant role in securing the transmission in the considered relay
wiretap channels than the AN signals from the relay. Second,
we show that adding extra antennas at the source significantly
increases the maximum secrecy throughput, but does not
decrease the secrecy outage probability always. Third, we find
that in order to achieve the maximum secrecy throughput, the
1An initial study of a much simpler system model is given in [33] where
the relay, the destination, and the eavesdroppers are all equipped with a single
antenna and AN signals are transmitted by the source in the first hop only.
This simplified system configuration allowed for analytical tractability at the
expense of significant sub-optimality.
Fig. 1. Illustration of a relay wiretap channel in the presence of spatially
random multi-antenna eavesdroppers.
source needs to allocate a higher power to AN signals whereas
the relay needs to allocate a lower power to AN signals
when the antenna number at the source increases. Fourth, we
find that the maximum secrecy throughput increases when the
eavesdroppers are more dispersed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the relay wiretap channel considered in the paper. In
Section III, we derive expressions for the outage probabilities
of the considered relay wiretap channel. The characterization
and maximization of the secrecy throughput are also provided
in Section III. Numerical results and related discussions are
presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V draws conclusions.
Notations: Column vectors (matrices) are denoted by bold-
face lower (upper) case letters. Conjugate transpose is denoted
by (·)H . The determinant of a matrix is denoted by det (·).
Complex Gaussian distribution is denoted by CN . A zero
matrix and an identity matrix of appropriate dimension are
denoted by 0 and I, respectively. Statistical expectation is
denoted by E. The Frobenius norm of a vector or a matrix
is denoted by ‖ · ‖.
II. MULTI-ANTENNA RELAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
We consider a relay wiretap channel, as depicted in Fig. 1,
where a source (S) communicates with a destination (D) with
the aid of a relay (R) in the presence of multiple spatially
random eavesdroppers. In this channel, the source, the relay,
the destination, and each eavesdropper are equipped with Ns,
Nr, Nd, and Ne antennas, respectively. We denote Hsr as
the Nr ×Ns channel matrix from the source to the relay and
denote Hrd as the Nd ×Nr channel matrix from the relay to
the destination. We consider that all the channels are subject to
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh fading.
We also consider a quasi-static block fading environment in
which all the channel coefficients remain the same within one
time slot. We assume that the channel state information (CSI)
between the source and the relay and the CSI between the
relay and the destination are known at the source, while the
CSI from the eavesdroppers is not known. We also assume
that Ns > Ne, mimicking the case where the source is a
base station (BS) with a large number of antennas, while
the eavesdroppers are mobile users with a limited number of
antennas. We further assume that the destination is located
remotely away from the source such that the destination
cannot receive signals from the source directly. All the nodes
operate in a half-duplex mode such that each node cannot
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transmit and receive simultaneously. We denote dsr and drd
as the source-relay distance and the relay-destination distance,
respectively, and denote η as the path loss exponent. The
locations of the eavesdroppers are modeled as a homogeneous
Poisson Point Process (PPP) Φ with density λ [18–22], which
represents the case where the eavesdroppers are mobile users
in a decentralized network [34]. We clarify that the source,
the relay, and the destination do not belong to Φ.
A. Transmission of Artificial Noise Signals
We now detail the transmission scheme between the source
and the destination. In this scheme we assume that both the
source and the relay transmit AN signals together with the
information signals. This scheme utilizes two time slots. In
the first time slot, the source transmits information signals
and AN signals to the relay, referred to as the first hop
transmission. We assume that the relay adopts maximum-ratio
combining (MRC) [35–37] to process the received signals
in order to maximize the received SNR. In the second time
slot, the DF relay transmits the re-encoded signals and AN
signals to the destination, referred to as the second hop
transmission. We assume that the destination also adopts MRC
to process the received signals. In the second time slot, it
is assumed that the source transmits AN signals to further
confuse the eavesdropper. We clarify that both the first hop
transmission and the second hop transmission are overheard
by the eavesdroppers.
In the first hop transmission, the signal transmitted by the
source is given by
xS =W1t1, (1)
where W1 denotes the Ns × Ns beamforming matrix at the
source and t1 denotes the combination of the information
signal and the AN signal at the source. To transmit xS, we
first design W1 as
W1 =
[
wS WSAN
]
, (2)
where wS is used to transmit the information signal at the
source and WSAN is used to transmit the AN signal at the
source. The aim of W1 is to degrade the quality of the
received signals at the eavesdroppers. By transmitting AN
signals throughW1, together with the fact that the relay adopts
MRC to process the received signals from the source, we
ensure that the quality of the received signals at the relay
is free from AN interference. In designing W1, we choose
wS as the eigenvector corresponding to the largest non-zero
eigenvalue of HHsrHsr, denoted by λsrmax. We then choose
WSAN as the remaining Ns−1 eigenvectors of HHsrHsr. Such
design ensures that W1 is a unitary matrix. We then design t
as
t1 =
[
tS
tSAN
]
, (3)
where tS denotes the information signal at the source and tSAN
is an (Ns − 1) × 1 vector of the AN signal at the source.
We define βs, 0 < βs ≤ 1, as the fraction of the power
allocated to the information signal at the source. As such, we
have E
[
|tS|2
]
= βs and E
[
tSANt
H
SAN
]
= 1−βs
Ns−1
INs−1. Based
on (1), (2), and (3), the received signal at the relay in the first
hop transmission is expressed as
yr =
√
Psd
−η
sr Hsr (wStS +WSANtSAN) + nr, (4)
where Ps denotes the transmit power at the source and nr
denotes the thermal noise at the relay, the elements of which
are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and variance σ2r , i.e., nr ∼ CN
(
0Nr , σ
2
rINr
)
.
We note that AN signals in (4) can be canceled at the relay
by applying MRC.
We next express the received signal at a typical eavesdrop-
per located at i, i ∈ Φ, in the first hop transmission as
y
(1)
i =
√
Psd
−η
si Hsi (wStS +WSANtSAN) + ni1, (5)
where Hsi denotes the Ne × Ns channel matrix from the
source to the typical eavesdropper located at i, dsi denotes
the distance between the source and the typical eavesdropper
located at i, and ni1 denotes the thermal noise vector at the
typical eavesdropper located at i, the elements of which are
assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and variance σ2i1, i.e., ni1 ∼ CN
(
0Ne , σ
2
i1INe
)
.
In the second time slot, the DF relay first decodes the
received signals from the source. If the received signals are
successfully decoded, the relay retransmits the re-encoded sig-
nals and AN signals to the destination. The signals transmitted
by the relay is given by
xR =W2t2, (6)
where W2 denotes the Nr × Nr beamforming matrix at the
relay and t2 denotes the combination of the information signal
and the AN signal at the relay. Similar to W1 and t1, we
design W2 and t2 as
W2 =
[
wR WRAN
]
, (7)
and
t2 =
[
tR
tRAN
]
, (8)
respectively. In (7), wR is used to transmit the information
signal at the relay and WRAN is used to transmit the AN
signal at the relay. In designing W2, we choose wR as
the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of
HHrdHrd, denoted by λrdmax. We then choose WRAN as the
remainingNr−1 eigenvectors ofHHrdHrd. This design ensures
that the quality of the received signals at the destination is free
from AN interference when the destination applies MRC to
process the received signals. In (8), tR denotes the information
signal at the relay and tRAN is an (Nr − 1) × 1 vector of
the AN signals at the relay. We define βr, 0 < βr ≤ 1,
as the fraction of the power allocated to the information
signals at the relay. As such, we have E
[
|tR|
2
]
= βr and
E
[
tRANt
H
RAN
]
= 1−βr
Nr−1
INr−1. According to (6), (7), and (8),
we express the received signal at the destination in the second
hop transmission as
yd =
√
Prd
−η
rd Hrd (wRtR +WRANtRAN) + nd, (9)
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where Pr denotes the transmit power at the relay and nd
denotes the thermal noise at the destination, the elements of
which are assumed to be i.i.d complex random variables with
zero mean and variance σ2d , i.e., nd ∼ CN
(
0Nd , σ
2
dINd
)
.
We note that AN signals in (9) can also be canceled at the
destination by applying MRC.
In order to further confuse the eavesdroppers in the second
hop transmission, we assume that the source transmits AN
signals using transmit power Ps. We denote the AN signals
from the source in the second hop transmission as xAN,
the elements of which follow the i.i.d zero mean complex
Gaussian distribution. We assume that xAN has unit power such
that E
[
xANx
H
AN
]
= INs/Ns. We next express the received
signal in the second hop transmission at a typical eavesdropper
located at i, i ∈ Φ, as
y
(2)
i =
√
Prd
−η
ri Hri (wRtR +WRANtRAN)
+
√
Psd
−η
si HsixAN + ni2, (10)
where Hri denotes the Ne × Nr channel matrix from the
relay to the typical eavesdropper located at i, dri denotes
the distance between the relay and the typical eavesdropper
located at i, and ni2 denotes the thermal noise vector at a
typical eavesdropper located at i, the elements of which are
assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and variance σ2i2, i.e., ni2 ∼ CN
(
0Ne , σ
2
i2INe
)
.
B. Formulation of Received Signal-to-Noise Ratios
We first focus on the equivalent instantaneous SNR at the
destination. Recall that both the relay and the destination
apply MRC to process received signals. We express the MRC
combiner at the relay in the first hop transmission as vr =
w
H
S H
H
sr
‖HsrwS‖
, and express the MRC combiner at the destination in
the second hop transmission as vd = w
H
R H
H
rd
‖HrdwR‖
. Using vr and
vd, we express the instantaneous SNR at the relay in the first
hop transmission and the instantaneous SNR at the destination
in the second hop transmission as γsr = βsPsdηsrσ2r λ
sr
max and
γrd =
βrPr
d
η
rd
σ2
d
λrdmax, respectively. As per the rules of the DF
protocol, we express the equivalent end-to-end SNR from the
source to the destination as [23]
ΓD = min {γsr, γrd} . (11)
We now focus on the equivalent SNR at the eavesdroppers.
In order to maximize the probability of successful eavesdrop-
ping, we assume that the eavesdropper utilizes the minimum
mean square error (MMSE) combining to process the received
signals within two time slots. As per the rules of the MMSE
combining, we express the instantaneous SNR at a typical
eavesdropper located at i in the first hop transmission and
the second hop transmission as
γsi = βsPsd
−η
si w
H
S H
H
siK
−1
si HsiwS, (12)
and
γri = βrPrd
−η
ri w
H
R H
H
riK
−1
ri HriwR, (13)
respectively, where
Ksi =
1− βs
Ns − 1
Psd
−η
si HsiWSANW
H
SANH
H
si + σ
2
i1INe , (14)
and
Kri =
1− βr
Nr − 1
Prd
−η
ri HriWRANW
H
RANH
H
ri
+
Ps
Ns
d−ηsi HsiH
H
si + σi2INe . (15)
We assume that the eavesdroppers are non-colluding, indicat-
ing that each eavesdropper decodes her own received signals
from the source and the relay without cooperating with other
eavesdroppers. We also assume that the source and the relay
use different codebooks. As such, the transmitted signals from
the source and the transmitted signals from the relay cannot
be jointly processed at each eavesdropper. Based on (12) and
(13), we express the equivalent SNR at the eavesdroppers as
ΓE = max
i∈Φ
{max {γsi, γri}} . (16)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance achieved
by the transmission scheme detailed in Section II. We first
derive a closed-form expression for the transmission outage
probability and an easy-to-compute expression for the secrecy
outage probability, both of which are valid for an arbitrary
number of antennas at the source, relay, and destination. We
then derive simple yet valuable expressions for the asymptotic
transmission outage probability and the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability, both of which are valid for a sufficiently
large number of antennas at the source, i.e., Ns → ∞. We
further describe in detail how the secrecy throughput of the
relay wiretap channel is quantified and how the maximum
secrecy throughput is obtained under a secrecy outage proba-
bility constraint.
A. Preliminaries
In this subsection, we present the statistics of γsr, γrd, γsi,
and γri, which will be used to derive the outage probabilities.
We first focus on the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)
of γsr and γrd. To this end, we introduce several new notations
as follows: u1 = min(Ns, Nr), v1 = max(Ns, Nr), t1 =
v1 − u1, u2 = min (Nr, Nd), v2 = max (Nr, Nd), and t2 =
v2 − u2. We then obtain the CDF of γsr as [38]
Fγsr (γ) =
det
(
Ξ
(
γ
βsγsr
))
Γu1 (u1) Γv1 (u1)
, (17)
where Ξ
(
γ
βsγsr
)
is a u1 × u1 matrix with (i, j)th entry,
ξij
(
γ
βsγsr
)
, given by
ξij
(
γ
βsγsr
)
= γ
(
g1 (i, j) ,
γ
βsγsr
)
. (18)
In (18), γ (·) denotes the incomplete gamma function, defined
as [39, Eq. (8.352)]
γ (k, x) = Γ (k)
(
1− exp (−x)
k−1∑
z=0
xz
z!
)
(19)
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for integer k, where Γ (·) denotes the gamma function, defined
as Γ (k) = (k− 1)! for integer k [39, Eq. (8.339)], g1 (i, j) =
t1 + i+ j − 1, γsr = Psd
−η
sr σ
−2
r , and
Γm (n) =
n∏
i=1
Γ (m− i+ 1) . (20)
Similarly, we obtain the CDF of γrd as
Fγrd (γ) =
det
(
Θ
(
γ
βrγrd
))
Γu2 (u2) Γv2 (u2)
, (21)
where Θ
(
γ
βrγrd
)
is a u2 × u2 matrix with (i, j)th entry,
θij
(
γ
βrγrd
)
, given by
θij
(
γ
βrγrd
)
= γ
(
g2 (i, j) ,
γ
βrγrd
)
, (22)
where g2 (i, j) = t2 + i+ j − 1, and γrd = Prd
−η
rd σ
−2
d .
With the aid of [40], we express the CDF of γsi as
Fγsi (γ) =1−
exp
(
− γ
βsγsi
)
(1 + κ1γ)
Ns−1
Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
(
γ
βsγsi
)p−1
×
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1γ)
q (23)
where γsi = Psd
−η
si σ
−2
i1 and κ1 =
1− βs
βs (Ns − 1)
, and express
the CDF of γri as
Fγri (γ)
=1−
exp
(
− γ
βrγri
)
(1 + κ2γ)
Nr−1 (1 + κ3γ)
Ns
Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(
γ
βrγri
)m−1
×
Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2γ)
n
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Ns
l
)
(κ3γ)
l
, (24)
where γri = Prd
−η
ri σ
−2
i2 , κ2 =
1−βr
βr(Nr−1)
, and κ3 = Psd
η
ri
βrPrNsd
η
si
.
B. Outage Probabilities
In this subsection, we define the transmission outage event
and the secrecy outage event and then characterize their
probabilities. We first denote Cb as the instantaneous capacity
between the source and the destination. According to (11), Cb
is given by
Cb =
1
2
log2 (1 + ΓD) , (25)
where the presence of the factor 1/2 is due to the fact that
two time slots are used in the transmission. We also denote
Ce as the instantaneous capacity between the source and the
eavesdropper. According to (16), Ce is given by
Ce =
1
2
log2 (1 + ΓE) . (26)
We assume that the wiretap code is adopted in the trans-
mission. We denote (Rb, Re) as the parameter pair for the
adopted wiretap code, where Rb denotes the transmission rate
of the wiretap code, and Re denotes the redundancy rate of the
wiretap code revealing the cost of preventing eavesdropping.
We also assume that the source and the relay use the same
(Rb, Re) to transmit, but with different codebooks. As such,
we define that the transmission outage event occurs when
Cb < Rb. In this event, the received signals at the destination
are not reliably decoded. We also define that the secrecy
outage event occurs when Ce ≥ Re. In this event, the
eavesdropper is able to decode the transmitted signals and
secrecy is compromised.
Based on the definition of the transmission outage event, we
define the transmission outage probability as the probability
that the equivalent instantaneous SNR at the destination is
less than τb = 2Rb − 1. Mathematically, Pto is formulated as
Pto = Pr (ΓD < τb) . (27)
Using (11), (17), and (21), we re-express the transmission
outage probability in (27) as
Pto = Pr (min {γsr, γrd} < τb)
= 1− (1− Fγsr (τb)) (1− Fγrd (τb))
=
det
(
Ξ
(
τb
βsγsr
))
Γu1 (u1) Γv1 (u1)
+
det
(
Θ
(
τb
βrγrd
))
Γu2 (u2) Γv2 (u2)
−
det
(
Ξ
(
τb
βsγsr
))
det
(
Θ
(
τb
βrγrd
))
Γu1 (u1) Γv1 (u1) Γu2 (u2) Γv2 (u2)
. (28)
Based on the definition of the secrecy outage event, we
define the secrecy outage probability as the probability that ΓE
is larger than τe = 2Re−1. Mathematically, Pso is formulated
as
Pso = Pr (ΓE > τe) . (29)
According to (16), (23), and (24), we derive an easy-to-
compute expression for the secrecy outage probability in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability of the relay
wiretap channel is derived as
Pso = 1− exp (−2λ (J1 + J2 − J3)) , (30)
where
J1 =
pi
η
(
βsPs
τeσ2i1
) 2
η
(1 + κ1τe)
−(Ns−1)
×
Ne∑
p=1
Γ
(
2
η
+ p− 1
)
Γ (p)
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
, (31)
J2 and J3 are given by (32) and (33), respectively, shown at
the top of the next page. In (32) and (33), we have ψ (θ) =
τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
(
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We find that Theorem 1 provides an easy-to-compute tool
for efficiently evaluating the secrecy outage probability. Al-
though J2 and J3 for general η cannot be obtained in closed-
form, they can be easily calculated since only a double integral
is involved in J2 and J3.
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J2 =(1 + κ2τe)
−(Nr−1)
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi
exp (−ψ (θ))(
1 + Psψ(θ)
Nsd
η
si
σ2
i2
)Ns
Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(ψ (θ))
m−1
×
Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Ns
l
)(
Psψ (θ)
Nsd
η
siσ
2
i2
)l
ddsidθ, (32)
J3 =(1 + κ1τe)
−(Ns−1) (1 + κ2τe)
−(Nr−1)
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
) Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
(
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)p−1 Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
×
exp (−ψ (θ))(
1 + Psψ(θ)
Nsd
η
si
σ2
i2
)Ns
Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(ψ (θ))
m−1
Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Ns
l
)(
Psψ (θ)
Nsd
η
siσ
2
i2
)l
ddsidθ. (33)
C. Asymptotic Outage Probabilities
In this subsection, we examine the asymptotic behavior of
the outage probabilities as Ns →∞. The obtained asymptotic
results are particular valuable for large-scale MIMO systems
where the source (or equivalently, the BS) is equipped with
a sufficiently large number of antennas. We first present the
expression for the asymptotic transmission outage probability
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The asymptotic transmission outage probabil-
ity when Ns →∞ is given by
P∞to =
det
(
Θ
(
τb
βrγrd
))
Γu2 (u2) Γv2 (u2)
. (34)
Proof: We express the asymptotic transmission outage
probability when Ns →∞ as
P∞to = lim
Ns→∞
Pto. (35)
We note that
lim
Ns→∞
Ξ
(
τb
βsγsr
)
Γu1 (u1) Γv1 (u1)
= 0. (36)
Substituting (36) into (35) yields the result.
According to Corollary 1, we find that the asymptotic
transmission outage probability is solely determined by γrd
when Ns →∞. This finding is due to the fact that γsr →∞
when Ns → ∞. As such, we conclude that the probability
that ΓD is less than τb when Ns → ∞ is determined by the
link quality of the relay-destination channel only.
We next present the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
when Ns →∞ in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The asymptotic secrecy outage probability
when Ns →∞ is given by
P∞so = 1− exp (−2λ (J
∞
1 + J
∞
2 − J
∞
3 )) , (37)
where
J∞1 =
pi
η
(
βsPs
τeσ2i1
) 2
η
exp
(
−
1− βs
βs
τe
)
×
Ne∑
p=1
Γ
(
2
η
+ p− 1
)
Γ (p)
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
1−βs
βs
τe
)q
Γ (q + 1)
, (38)
J∞2 and J∞3 are given by (39) and (40), respectively, shown
at the top of the next page.
Proof: We express the asymptotic secrecy outage proba-
bility when Ns →∞ as
P∞so = lim
Ns→∞
Pso. (41)
We note that
lim
Ns→∞
(
1 +
(1− βs) τe
βs (Ns − 1)
)−(Ns−1)
= exp
(
−
1− βs
βs
τe
)
,
(42)
and
lim
Ns→∞
(
Ns − 1
q
)(
(1− βs) τe
βs (Ns − 1)
)q
=
(
1−βs
βs
τe
)q
Γ (q + 1)
. (43)
We also note
lim
Ns→∞
(
1 +
Psψ (θ)
Nsd
η
siσ
2
i2
)−Ns
= exp
(
−
Psψ (θ)
dηsiσ
2
i2
)
, (44)
and
lim
Ns→∞
(
Ns
l
)(
Psψ (θ)
Nsd
η
siσ
2
i2
)l
=
(
Psψ(θ)
d
η
si
σ2
i2
)l
Γ (l + 1)
. (45)
Substituting (42), (43), (44), and (45) into (41) yields (37),
which completes the proof.
According to Corollary 2, we find that the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability approaches a certain value that is
independent of Ns when Ns → ∞. This reveals that adding
extra transmit antennas at the source does not always decrease
the secrecy outage probability.
D. Secrecy Throughput
So far, we have derived the exact and the asymptotic
transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability
of the considered relay wiretap channel. Our derived expres-
sions are valid for given Rb, Re, βs, and βr. A question
then naturally arises: “How do we determine the optimal
(R∗◦b , R
∗◦
e , β
∗◦
s , β
∗◦
r ) that achieves the maximum secrecy per-
formance of this relay wiretap channel, under a secrecy
outage probability constraint?” Our answer to this question
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J∞2 =(1 + κ2τe)
−(Nr−1)
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsiexp
(
−ψ (θ) −
Psψ (θ)
dηsiσ
2
i2
) Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(ψ (θ))
m−1
×
Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Psψ(θ)
d
η
si
σ2
i2
)l
Γ (l + 1)
ddsidθ, (39)
J∞3 =
exp
(
− 1−βs
βs
τe
)
(1 + κ2τe)
Nr−1
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
) Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
(
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)p−1 Ne−p∑
q=0
(
1−βs
βs
τe
)q
Γ (q + 1)
× exp
(
−ψ (θ)−
Psψ (θ)
dηsiσ
2
i2
) Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(ψ (θ))m−1
Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Psψ(θ)
d
η
si
σ2
i2
)l
Γ (l+ 1)
ddsidθ. (40)
demonstrates the usefulness of our analytical expressions in a
wider sense. It shows how the expressions can be embedded
and utilized in a complex optimization problem, presenting
a solution that can be determined in a much faster manner
than would otherwise be possible. A concrete example of
this usefulness in an operational sense, would be the dynamic
and real-time determination of the optimal system parameter
settings for a given secrecy performance metric.
To answer the question, we utilize our derived expressions
directly to characterize the secrecy performance of the relay
wiretap channel. As a specific example, we consider the metric
termed the secrecy throughput introduced by [10]. This perfor-
mance metric quantifies the average confidential information
rate when the source transmits. The secrecy throughput for the
relay wiretap channel is given by
Ts = (Rb −Re) (1− Pto) . (46)
The maximization problem is accordingly formulated as
max
Rb,Re,βs,βr
Ts, (47a)
s.t. Pso ≤ ϕ, (47b)
0 ≤Re ≤ Rb, (47c)
0 <βs ≤ 1, 0 < βr ≤ 1. (47d)
In the following, we describe in detail how the maximum
secrecy throughput is obtained by judiciously selecting the
transmission parameters2. To this end, we solve the maxi-
mization problem in (47) in two steps. First, we fix power
allocation factors βs and βr, and choose the wiretap code
rates pair, (R∗b , R∗e), that maximizes the secrecy throughput.
Accordingly, the maximum secrecy throughput achieved by
(R∗b , R
∗
e) for given βs and βr is defined as T ∗s . Second, we
choose the wiretap code rates as well as the power allocation
factor, (R∗◦b , R∗◦e , β∗◦s , β∗◦r ), that jointly maximizes Ts. The
details of these two steps are presented as follows:
1) (R∗b , R∗e) for given βs and βr: The wiretap code rates
pair, (R∗b , R∗e), that maximizes Ts for given βs and βr is
2We note that the maximum secrecy throughput is formally a local max-
imum, since we numerically search the transmission parameters that jointly
maximize the secrecy throughput only within anticipated ranges.
determined as
(R∗b , R
∗
e) = argmax Ts, (48a)
s.t. Pso ≤ ϕ, (48b)
0 ≤ Re ≤ Rb. (48c)
Taking the first-order derivative of Pso with respect to Re,
we confirm that ∂Pso/∂Re < 0, which indicates that Pso
monotonically decreases as Re increases. As such, the value
of R∗e satisfying (48b) is the value of R∗e that satisfies the
secrecy outage probability constraint, i.e., Pso (R∗e) = ϕ.
We then confirm that ∂Pto/∂Rb > 0, which shows that Pto
monotonically increases as Re increases. As such, we note that
Ts → 0 as Rb increases such that Pto → 1. Defining Rmaxb as
the value of Rb that satisfies Pto (Rb) = 1, we rewrite (48) as
(R∗b , R
∗
e) = argmax Ts, (49a)
s.t. Pso ≤ ϕ, (49b)
R∗e ≤ Rb ≤ R
max
b . (49c)
Although a closed-form solution for (R∗b , R∗e) is mathemati-
cally intractable, we are able to find the values of (R∗b , R∗e) in
a numerical way.
2) (R∗◦b , R∗◦e , β∗◦s , β∗◦r ): The wiretap code rates and power
allocation factors which jointly maximizes Ts in (46),
(R∗◦b , R
∗◦
e , β
∗◦
s , β
∗◦
r ), is determined as
(R∗◦b , R
∗◦
e , β
∗◦
s , β
∗◦
r ) = argmax Ts, (50a)
s.t. Pso ≤ ϕ, (50b)
0 ≤ Re ≤ Rb, (50c)
0 < βs ≤ 1, 0 < βr ≤ 1. (50d)
Using (28) and (30), we are able to solve (50) numer-
ically. Specifically, we first select the value of (R∗b , R∗e)
satisfying (49) for each value of βs and βr. This leads to
the secrecy throughput with (R∗b , R∗e), denoted by T ∗s =
(R∗b −R
∗
e) (1− Pto). We then select the value of β∗◦s and
the value of β∗◦r that maximize T ∗s for 0 < βs ≤ 1 and
0 < βr ≤ 1. Accordingly, the value of (R∗b , R∗e) associated
with β∗◦s and β∗◦r is defined as (R∗◦b , R∗◦e ). Finally, the maxi-
mum secrecy throughput achieved by (R∗◦b , R∗◦e , β∗◦s , β∗◦r ) is
defined as T ∗◦s .
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Fig. 2. Pto versus τb for different values of γb with η = 4, Ns = 4, Nr = 2,
Nd = 2, Ne = 2, βs = βr = 0.5, λ = 0.01, and dsr = drd = 10.
We note that our expressions for the outage probabilities
can also be implemented in other performance metrics. For
example, we can utilize our expressions to characterize the
average secrecy rate of the relay wiretap channels in the
presence of spatially random eavesdroppers.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate
our analysis of the outage probabilities. We also examine
the impact of transmission parameters (e.g., Rb, βs, βr) and
system parameters (e.g., Ns and λ) on the secrecy throughput
of the relay wiretap channel. Throughout this section we
concentrate on the practical example of a highly shadowed
urban area with η = 4.
We first demonstrate the accuracy of the transmission outage
probability and the secrecy outage probability using Monte
Carlo simulations. In Fig. 2, we plot Pto versus τb for different
values of γb with Ns = 4, Nr = 2, Nd = 2, Ne = 2,
βs = βr = 0.5, λ = 0.01, and dsr = drd = 10. In this
figure, we consider γsr = γrd = γb. We first see that the
analytical curves, generated from (28), precisely match the
simulation points marked by red circles, which demonstrates
the correctness of our expression for Pto in (28). Second,
we see that Pto increases monotonically as τb increases for a
given γb. This reveals that the transmission outage probability
increases when the transmission rate of the wiretap code
increases. We further see that Pto decreases as γb increases for
a given τb. This reveals that the transmission outage probability
reduces when the source and the relay use a higher power to
transmit for a fixed τb.
In Fig. 3, we plot Pso versus τe for different values of γe
with Ns = 4, Nr = 2, Nd = 2, Ne = 2, and βs = βr =
0.5. In this figure we consider γsrσ2r/σ2i1 = γrdσ2d/σ2i2 =
γe. We see an excellent match between the analytical curves
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
100
τe (dB)
P
s
o
γe = 10 dB
γe = 5 dB
γe = 0 dB
Simulation
Analysis
Fig. 3. Pso versus τe for different values of γe with η = 4, Ns = 4, Nr =
2, Nd = 2, Ne = 2, βs = βr = 0.5, λ = 0.01, and dsr = drd = 10.
generated from (30) and the simulation points marked by red
circles, demonstrating the correctness of our expression for Pso
in (30). We then see that Pso decreases monotonically as τe
increases for a given γe, which shows that the secrecy outage
probability decreases when the redundancy rate of the wiretap
code increases. We further observe that Pso increases as γe
increases. This is due to the fact the eavesdroppers receive
signals from both the source and the relay. It follows that
increasing the transmit power at the source and the relay leads
to an improved received SNR at the eavesdroppers.
In the following, we examine the impact of the transmission
parameters on the secrecy throughput that is characterized by
the derived outage probabilities. We first examine the impact of
Rb on Ts. In Fig. 4, we plot Ts versus Rb for different values
of Ns with R∗e and fixed Nd, Ne, βs, and βr. We first observe
that there exists a unique R∗b that maximizes Ts for given βs
and βr. We also observe that the maximum Ts for given βs and
βr, i.e., T ∗s , increases as Ns increases. This shows that adding
extra transmit antennas at the source significantly enhances the
secrecy performance of the relay wiretap channel.
We next examine the impact of βs and βr on T ∗s . In Fig.
5, we plot T ∗s versus βs for different values of Ns with a
fixed βr. For each point of T ∗s , we choose (R∗b , R∗e) that
maximizes Ts for the corresponding βs. We first observe
that there exists a unique β∗◦s that maximizes T ∗s . We then
observe that the maximum T ∗s for a fixed βr increases as
Ns increases. Furthermore, we observe that the value of
β∗◦s slightly decreases as Ns increases, which shows that in
order to maintain the maximum secrecy throughput, the power
allocated to AN signals at the source needs to be increased as
the number of antennas at the source increases.
In Fig. 6, we plot T ∗s versus βr for different values of Ns
with a fixed βs. Similar as Fig. 5, for each point of T ∗s , we
choose (R∗b , R∗e) that maximizes Ts for the corresponding βr.
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Fig. 4. Ts versus Rb for different values of Ns with η = 4, Nr = 2,
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Fig. 5. T ∗s versus βs for different values of Ns with η = 4, Nr = 2,
Nd = 2, Ne = 2, βr = 0.5, λ = 0.01, dsr = drd = 10, ϕ = 0.4,
γb = 10 dB, and γb/γe = 20.
First, we see a unique β∗◦r that maximizes T ∗s . Second, we see
that the maximum T ∗s for a fixed βs increases as Ns increases.
Additionally, we note that the value of β∗◦r increases as Ns
increases, demonstrating that a lower power is needed to be
allocated to AN signals at the relay in order to achieve the
maximum secrecy throughput when the antenna number at the
source increases.
Finally, we examine the impact of Ns and λ on T ◦∗s . In Fig.
7, we plot T ∗◦s versus Ns for different values of λ. For each
point of T ∗◦s , we choose (β∗◦s , βr, R∗◦b , R∗◦e ) that maximizes
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Fig. 6. T ∗s versus βr for different values of Ns with η = 4, Nr = 2,
Nd = 2, Ne = 2, βs = 0.5, λ = 0.01, dsr = drd = 10, ϕ = 0.4,
γb = 10 dB, and γb/γe = 20.
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Fig. 7. T ∗◦s versus Ns for different values of λ with η = 4, Nr = 2, Nd =
2, Ne = 2, dsr = drd = 10, ϕ = 0.4, γb = 10 dB, and γb/γe = 20.
Ts. We first observe that T ∗◦s increases as Ns increases. This
observation is consistent with the observation in Fig. 4. We
then observe that T ∗◦s decreases as λ increases. This is due
to the fact that more eavesdroppers exist as λ increases. The
increasing number of eavesdroppers increases the value of R∗e
that satisfies the secrecy constraint.
V. CONCLUSION
We designed the secure transmission that maximizes the
secrecy throughput of the generalized relay wiretap channel in
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the presence of spatially random multi-antenna eavesdroppers.
In the transmission we assumed that both the source and
the relay transmit AN signals with information signals in
order to confuse the eavesdroppers. Considering the use of
the decode-and-forward relaying protocol, we first derived a
closed-form expression for the transmission outage probability
and an easy-to-compute expression for the secrecy outage
probability. We then derived simple yet valuable expressions
for the asymptotic transmission outage probability and the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability when the number of
antennas at the source becomes sufficiently large. Using our
derived expressions, we characterized the secrecy throughput
of the the relay wiretap channel and then determined the
transmission and system parameters that achieve the maximum
secrecy throughput. Finally, we evaluated the impact of these
parameters on the secrecy throughput.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to (16), (23), and (24), we re-express (29) as
Pso = 1− Pr {ΓE ≤ τe}
= 1− Pr
{
max
i∈Φ
{max {γsi, γri}} ≤ τe
}
= 1− EΦ
[∏
i∈Φ
Pr {max {γsi, γri} ≤ τe}
]
= 1− EΦ
[∏
i∈Φ
Fγsi (τe)Fγri (τe)
]
(a)
= 1− exp (−2λ (J1 + J2 − J3)) . (48)
where
J1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi

exp
(
− τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)
(1 + κ1τe)
Ns−1
Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
(
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)p−1
×
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
)
ddsidθ, (49)
J2
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi
exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
dηri
)
(1 + κ2τe)
Nr−1
(
1 +
Psτed
η
ri
βrPrNsd
η
si
)Ns
×
Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(
τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
dηri
)m−1 Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
×
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Ns
l
)(
Psτed
η
ri
βrPrNsd
η
si
)l
ddsidθ, (50)
and
J3
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi
exp
(
− τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi −
τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
dηri
)
(1 + κ1τe)
Ns−1
× (1 + κ2τe)
−(Nr−1)
(
1 +
Psd
η
riτe
βrPrNsd
η
si
)−Ns
×
Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
(
τeσi1
βsPs
dηsi
)p−1 Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
×
Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(
τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
dηri
)m−1 Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
×
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Ns
l
)(
Psd
η
riτe
βrPrNsd
η
si
)l
ddsidθ. (51)
In (48), the operation (a) can be justified by applying the
probability generating functional (PGFL) for the PPP Φ, given
by [41]
EΦ
[∏
x∈Φ
f (x)
]
= exp
{
−
∫
R2
[1− f (x)]λdx
}
, (52)
and by changing to polar coordinates.
In order to proceed with our analysis we first derive J1 as
J1 =pi (1 + κ1τe)
−(Ns−1)
Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
×
∫ ∞
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)(
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)p−1
ddsi
(b)
=
pi
2
(1 + κ1τe)
−(Ns−1)
Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
×
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
u
η
2
)(
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
u
η
2
)p−1
du
(c)
=
pi
η
(
βsPs
τeσ2i1
) 2
η
(1 + κ1τe)
−(Ns−1)
×
Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
×
∫ ∞
0
exp (−t) t
2
η
+p−1dt
(d)
=
pi
η
(
βsPs
τeσ2i1
) 2
η
(1 + κ1τe)
−(Ns−1)
×
Ne∑
p=1
Γ
(
2
η
+ p− 1
)
Γ (p)
Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q , (53)
where in (b) we use u = d2si, in (c) we use t =
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
u
η
2 ,
and (d) follows from the definition of the gamma function.
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Similarly, we derive J2 as
J2
(e)
= (1 + κ2τe)
−(Nr−1)
×
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi
exp
(
− τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
(
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)
(
1 +
Psτe(d2sr+d2si−2dsrdsi cos θ)
η
2
βrPrNsd
η
si
)Ns
×
Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(
τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
(
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)m−1
×
Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Ns
l
)(
Psτe
βrPrNsd
η
si
)l
×
((
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)l
ddsidθ, (54)
where in (e) we apply the cosine formula. We further derive
J3 as
J3
=(1 + κ1τe)
−(Ns−1) (1 + κ2τe)
−(Nr−1)
×
∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)
×
Ne∑
p=1
1
Γ (p)
(
τeσ
2
i1
βsPs
dηsi
)p−1 Ne−p∑
q=0
(
Ns − 1
q
)
(κ1τe)
q
×
exp
(
− τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
(
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)
(
1 +
Psτe(d2sr+d2si−2dsrdsi cos θ)
η
2
βrPrNsd
η
si
)Ns
×
Ne∑
m=1
1
Γ (m)
(
τeσ
2
i2
βrPr
(
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)m−1
×
Ne−m∑
n=0
(
Nr − 1
n
)
(κ2τe)
n
Ne−m−n∑
l=0
(
Ns
l
)(
Psτe
βrPrNsd
η
si
)l
×
((
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)l
ddsidθ, (55)
Substituting (53), (54), and (55) into (48), we obtain the
desired result in (30), which completes the proof.
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